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AN UPDATE OF THE NEW TENNESSEE
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
JOHN

L. SOBIESKI, JR.*

The four-year effort to simplify and modernize the law of
appellate procedure in Tennessee reached fruition on July 1,

1979, the effective date of the new Tennessee Rules of Appellate
Procedure.' Most of the law set forth in the new rules has

been discussed in two previous articles concerning the thenproposed rules.2 However, shortly before the rules were submitted
for approval to the General Assembly by the Tennessee Supreme
Court, a number of significant changes were made in them. Some
of these changes originated with the Tennessee Supreme Court's
Advisory Commission on Civil Rules and others with the state
* B.S., Loyola University (Chicago); J.D., University of Michigan; Asso-

ciate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee; Reporter, Tennessee Supreme
Court Advisory Commission on Civil Rules.
The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful suggestions and encouragement of Professor Fredrich H. Thomforde, Jr., friend and colleague.
Although the author served as Reporter to the Tennessee Supreme Court
Advisory Commission on Civil Rules in the preparation of the appellate rules,
the views expressed in this article are personal and enjoy no other status.
1. In addition to the appeilate rules, the state supreme court submitted to the General Assembly a repealer statute that would have eliminated or
amended those portions of the Tennessee Code superseded or modified by the
new rules. While the senate passed the repealer statute, the House Judiciary
Committee deferred action on the statute. The rules by their own force, however,
repeal all statutes in conflict therewith under the terms of the rulemaking statute pursuant to which the new rules were fashioned. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 16116 (Cum. Supp. 1978) ("After such rules shall have become effective, all laws
in conflict therewith shall have no further force or effect."). The repealer statute
would simply have made explicit what is implicit in the approval of the rules.
For a tabular portrayal of the repealer statute, see Sobieski, New Rules of
Appellate Procedure Became Effective July 1, 15 TENN. B.J. 11, 13-20 (Aug.
1979).
2. See Sobieski, The'ProceduralDetails of the Proposed Tennessee Rules
of Appellate Procedure, 46 TENN. L. REV. 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Procedural Details]; Sobieski, The Theoretical Foundations of the Proposed
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, 45 TENN. L. REv. 161 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Theoretical Foundations]. These earlier articles were published. prior to the amendments that were made in the rules shortly before as
well as after their submission to the General Assembly. Except with regard to
those amendments discussed in this article, the earlier discussions remain a
relevant source of information concerning the appellate rules.

TENNESSEE LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 46

supreme court itself. In addition, the supreme court made one
final change after the rules had been submitted to the legislature.
The purpose of this discussion is to supplement the earlier articles
concerning the rules by highlighting the changes made in them
"shortly before their submission and approval.
One of the most significant changes in the rules made by the
state supreme court is an amendment to rule 3(e), which preserves the requirement that the appellant move for a new trial in
jury cases in order to raise on appeal alleged errors occurring
during trial.- The amendment incorporated into rule 3(e) by the
supreme court provides:
[I]n all cases tried by a jury, no assignment of error shall be
predicated upon alleged error in the admission or exclusion of
testimony, jury instructions granted or refused, misconduct of
jurors, parties or counsel, or other action committed or occurring
during the trial of the case, or other ground upon which a new
trial is sought, unless the same was specifically stated in a motion for a new trial in the lower court and decided adversely to
the appellant; otherwise such assignments will be treated as
waived.'
3. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 14(5), 218 Tenn. 816 (1967); Tenn. Ct. App. R.
12(6), 227 Tenn. Decs. xvi (1972)(as amended 235 Tenn. Decs. xxxiv (1975)).
4. This language is substantially the same as that of Tenn. Sup. Ct. R.
14(5), 218 Tenn. 816 (1967), which provided:
Error in the admission or exclusion of testimony, in charging a jury, or
refusing further instructions, misconduct of jurors, parties or counsel,
or other action occurring or committed on the trial of the case, civil or
criminal, or other grounds upon which a new trial is sought, will not
constitute a ground for reversal, and a new trial, unless it affirmatively

appears that the same was specifically stated in the motion made for a
new trial in the lower court, and decided adversely to the plaintiff in
error, but will be treated as waived, in all cases in which motions for a
new trial are permitted ....
Former rule 12(6) of the Court of Appeals was identical to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R.
14(5) in all material respects.
The reference to assignments of error in the court's amendment of rule 3(e)
should not create any problems even though assignments of error are explicitly
abolished in rule 3(h). Assignments of error are abolished in the new rules
because
as a part of a modern system of appellate review assignments of error
serve no jurisdictional purpose, and are useful only for giving notice of
the points to be raised before the appellate court. When used simply
for this purpose, there is a definite advantage in dropping the term
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The thrust of this language is unmistakable. As a prerequisite to
obtaining review on appeal in a jury action of any error relating
to what occurred during trial or of any error upon which a new
trial is sought in the appellate court, the appellant must make a
new-trial motion in the trial court that specifically sets forth the
error appellant seeks to present for appellate review. If the appellant does not specifically set forth the error in a new-trial motion,
he may not obtain appellate review. Given the unmistakable
thrust of the court's amendment to rule 3(e), it seems certain that
the reference to the admission or exclusion of "testimony" is not
restrictive and that errors concerning the admission or exclusion
of any evidence, including documentary evidence and other phys"assignment of error," since it carries with it common-law implications
which merely confuse and obstruct ....
Sunderland, A Simplified System of Appellate Procedure,17 TENN. L. Rev. 651,
660 (1943). The state supreme court's use of the term "assignment of error" in
its amendment to rule 3(e) is intended simply to refer to the method by which
the appellate court is notified of the points to be raised before it and is not
intended to revive the common-law "notion that assignments of error constitute
the jurisdictional foundation for the appeal in the same sense that pleadings
constitute the jurisdictional basis of the proceedings below." Id.For assignments of error, the new rules substitute the term "issues presented for review."
The supreme court's reference in rule 3(e) to assignments of error should be
construed as referring to the issues presented for review.
5. This statement of the general rule is subject to the qualification that
under TmNN. R. App. P. 2 the appellate courts may suspend for good cause the
requirement of a new-trial motion as a prerequisite of review in jury actions. The
burden would rest on the appellant, however, to demonstrate good cause for
relief from his failure to move for a new trial.
The appellate court also has the power under TENN. R. APP. P. 13(b) to
consider on its own motion issues not presented for review by the parties. See
TheoreticalFoundations, supra note 2, at 194-200. That power should be wholly
unaffected by the failure of an appellant either to move for a new trial in a jury
case or to include in his motion the issue the court wishes to consider. While an
appellate court generally should consider only those issues presented for review
by the parties, rule 13(b) recognizes that in some circumstances important
interests other than those of the immediate parties require or permit an appellate court to consider issues not presented for review. In most cases, the issue
an appellate court wishes to consider on its own motion will not have been
presented for consideration at the trial level. Vestal, Sua Sponte Consideration
in Appellate Review, 27 FORDHAM L. Rxv. 477, 490 (1959). Therefore, if rule 13(b)
is to serve its intended purpose, the power of an appellate court to invoke that
rule should not depend on whether the appellant moves for a new trial in a jury
case or on whether the appellant includes the issue in his motion.
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ical exhibits, must be set forth in a new-trial motion.
The extent to which the errors that may be raised on appeal
will be limited by the formulation of the errors in the new-trial
motion will hinge upon the interpretation the appellate courts
'give to the requirement of rule 3(e) that the error be "specifically
stated" in the new-trial motion.7 That interpretation in turn may
depend on the reasons for the supreme court's decision to retain
the new-trial motion as a prerequisite to review in jury cases. In
amending rule 3(e) the supreme court did not explicitly set forth
the interests it thought would be served by requiring a new-trial
motion. Apparently, however, some members of the court
thought that requiring appellant to move for a new trial results
in better appeals. What is meant by this justification for retention of new-trial motions in jury cases is not entirely clear. Perhaps the idea is that requiring the appellant to move for a new
trial forces him to articulate in writing which errors he believes
justify relief from the judgment.' In so doing the appellant may
discover that his tentative objections will not jell in the writing'
and that he has no reasonable prospect for success either with
regard to the new-trial motion itself or on a later appeal. Requiring new-trial motions thus might be considered a means of deterring appeals that have little likelihood of success and a way of
preserving appellate resources for more deserving appeals. Moreover, the thinking occasioned by the making of a new-trial motion
may lead to an even more thoughtful and refined argument on
appeal. Thus, new-trial motions would also serve to promote
better-argued cases on appeal. Finally, retention of the new-trial
motion may reflect a desire on the part of the supreme court to
6. Errors concerning the admission or exclusion of evidence other than
testimony would seem within the scope of the language of rule 3(e) concerning
"other action committed or occurring during the trial of the case, or other
ground upon which a new trial is sought."
7. In interpreting the same requirement in its prior rule, see note 4 supra,
the supreme court has held that "the grounds set out in the [new-trialI motion
should be as specific and certain as the nature of the error complained of will
permit." Memphis St. R.R. v. Johnson, 114 Tenn. 632, 643, 88 S.W. 169, 171
(1905); see, e.g., Ferguson v. State, 166 Tenn. 308, 61 S.W.2d 467 (1933).
8. Motions generally must be made in writing. See TENN. R. Civ. P. 7.02;
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 47.

9. Cf. Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of State Appellate
Courts, 24 U. CH. L. REv. 211, 218 (1957) (writing is "thinking at its hardest").
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afford the trial court a final opportunity, which in fairness it
arguably should have, to correct on its own any harmful error.
The persuasiveness of these reasons for requiring a new-trial
motion as a prerequisite to review in jury actions is another matter. In the first place, whether the decision to appeal is based
solely or even principally upon an assessment of the probability
of success on appeal is certainly debatable, even assuming that
assessment will not be distorted by partisan zeal. Certainly in
criminal cases and in jury-tried civil cases as well, appeals that
have no prospect of success are taken. Also, it seems open to
question whether in fact the quality of argument on appeal in jury
cases is substantially better than that in nonjury actions in which
a new-trial motion is not required. Moreover, whatever the advantages of requiring new-trial motions, there are also disadvantages. The experience of the members of the Advisory Commission is that new-trial motions are so seldom granted that they
typically only increase the cost and delay final disposition of
litigation. 0 Fairness to the trial court would seem to require only
that the matters to be urged on appeal be brought to the trial
court's attention at some appropriate time during the proceedings, not that such matters necessarily be incorporated in a newtrial motion.' 1 But the reasons for retaining the new-trial motion
as a prerequisite to review in jury cases have an even more fundamental flaw in that they fail to offer an explanation of why a
comparable post-trial motion is not required in actions tried with-

10. See D. MEADOR, APPELLATE Cowrrs: STAFF AND PROCESS INTHE CRISIS
OF VOLUME 143-46 (1974); D. MEADOR, CRIMINAL APPALS: ENGLISH PRACTICES AND
AMERICAN REFORMS 85-86 (1973); Wicker, A Comparison of Appellate Procedure
in Tennessee and in the Federal Courts, 17 TENN. L. REv. 668, 674 (1943).

11.

The Advisory Commission, in recommending that a new-trial motion

no longer be a prerequisite of review in jury cases, nonetheless cautioned that
"[f]ailure to present an issue to the trial court . . .will typically not merit
appellate relief." TENN. R. AP. P. 3(e), Advisory Comm'n comment. Under rule

36(a) relief on appeal need not "be granted to a party responsible for an error
or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or
nullify the harmful effect of an error." Even if new-trial motions were no longer
required in jury cases, therefore, appellant would still have to make a timely
objection during the proceedings in the trial court to obtain appellate relief. But

elimination of the new-trial motion as a prerequisite of review would mean that
any errors at the trial to which objection was duly made could be raised on
appeal without a new-trial motion raising the objection a second time. See
Procedural Details, supra note 2, at 11-13.
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out a jury.'2 Indeed, given the trial court's added responsibility
of finding the facts and applying the law to the facts, 3 the concern of treating the trial court fairly would seem more appropriate
in nonjury actions.
Regardless of the merits of the supreme court's decision to
retain the new-trial motion as a prerequisite to review in jury
cases, the specifically stated language of rule 3(e) should not be
given an overly restrictive interpretation. It is important to keep
in mind that the new-trial motion must be made shortly after
trial, without much time for legal research and reflection, and
oftentimes without a transcript.' 4 As a result, to expect the newtrial motion to be formulated with the care and precision of the
brief on appeal is simply not realistic. A new-trial motion, therefore, should be found to satisfy the specifically stated criterion of
amended rule 3(e) as long as it makes known to the trial court
the act, event, or default that the appellant urges as harmful error
on appeal.
The requirement of a new-trial motion as a prerequisite to
review in jury cases may also give rise to some difficulties if the
appellee also seeks appellate review and relief. Under rule 13(a),
any question of law may be brought up for review and relief by
any party. One purpose of this rule is to eliminate any requirement that an appellee also appeal in order to obtain appellate
review and relief.'" "[it is not unreasonable that the appellee,
without the necessity of also appealing, should be able to enlarge
his rights, when forced into the appellate court.""' But will the
12. In addition to a new-trial motion, the disappointed litigant in a nonjury case may make a motion under TENN. R. Ctv. P. 52.02 to amend or to make
additional findings of fact. A motion to alter or to amend the judgment under
TENN. R. Civ. P. 59.03 may also be made in both jury and nonjury actions.
13. See TENN. R. Civ. P. 52.01.
14. New-trial motions must be filed and served within 30 days after entry
of the judgment in civil actions, see id. R. 59.01, and must be "made" within
30 days after verdict in criminal actions. See TENN. R. CRIM. P. 33(b). Criminal
rule 47 requires motions other than those made during a trial or hearing to be
in writing, and criminal rule 49 requires written motions to be served and filed.
A new-trial motion will probably be considered timely made in criminal cases
only if it is filed and served within 30 days after verdict.
15. See generally Theoretical Foundations, supra note 2, at 187-94.
16. 51 HARV. L. REv. 1058, 1067 (1938); see 15C. Wmrr, A. MILLER & E.
CooPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROcEDURE § 3904 (1976); Stern, When to CrossAppeal or Cross-Petition-Certaintyor Confusion?, 87 HARV. L. REV. 763 (1974).
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appellee be able to obtain review and relief in jury cases if he has
not made a new-trial motion? The rules do not provide an explicit
answer to this question, but certainly if the appellee is completely
satisfied with the judgment in the trial court a new-trial motion
should not be required. An appellee should always be permitted
to urge any ground supported by the record to uphold the judgment as entered below." Nor should the appellee be required to
make a new-trial motion calling attention to those matters he
may urge on appeal that would enlarge his rights or that would
lessen the rights of the appellant under the judgment entered in
the trial court.' 8 A putative appellee, though not entirely satisfied
with the judgment, may nonetheless be willing to abide by it as
long as the other parties are also willing to do so. Yet, if the
appellee is unable to obtain appellate review or relief absent his
own new-trial motion, he may be forced to file a motion for a new
trial-one he has no genuine desire of obtaining-solely to protect
his opportunity to obtain review and relief in the event another
party to the action takes an appeal. The appellee will be alerted
to the possibility of an appeal as soon as another party to the
action moves for a new trial. But he may be served with the
motion at or near the end of the thirty-day period for moving for
a new trial so that as a practical matter he cannot file and serve
a new-trial motion that specifically sets forth all the errors he
may seek to raise on appeal." An appellee could protect himself,
17. This is the rule followed in federal practice with regard to issues the
appellee may urge on appeal if he has not filed his own notice of appeal. See
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Ludwig, 426 U.S. 479 (1976) (per curiam);
Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 535-39 (1931); United States v. American Ry.
Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435 (1924). See generaUy 9 MooiE's FEDERAL
PRAMCE 204.1113] (2d ed. 1975); C, WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
523 (3d ed. 1976); 15 C. WmoRT, A. MILER & E. COOPER, supra note 16, § 3904.
18. In federal practice an appellee must file his own notice of appeal if he
seeks to enlarge his own rights- or lessen the rights of the appellant under the
judgment of the district court. See note 17 supra. Federal as well as state experience has demonstrated the difficulty of formulating and applying a test concerning the situations in which an appellee must appeal or cross-appeal. See 9
204.11(31-[51 (2d ed. 1975); Stem, supra note
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
16; 25 ME. L. REv. 105 (1973). Similar difficulties might attend an effort to
delineate the circumstances in which appellee must move for a new trial.
19. To eliminate an analogous problem in federal appellate practice, FED.
R. APP. P. 4(a) allows a party 14 days to file notice of appeal after any other
party appeals. See 9 Mooiw's FEDERAL PneTnicE 204.11[iJ (2d ed. 1975). No
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therefore, only by filing a protective new-trial motion,1 and that
procedure would frustrate the purposes of the new rules, which
seek to simplify the law and to eliminate needless technicalities.2-'
Under no circumstances, therefore, should an appellee be required to move for a new trial in order to obtain appellate review
and relief.2
comparable extension is permitted in TENN. R. Civ. P. 59.01 for filing a newtrial motion after any other party has moved for a new trial.
Any requirement that appellee file his own new-trial motion should not
depend upon the time that remains available to him to so move after being
served with appellant's new-trial motion. Any such line-drawing would be essentially arbitrary.
20. Cf. Stem, supra note 16, at 766-67 (discussing an analogous problem
in federal practice).
Failure of an appellee to move for a new trial could be excused by the
appellate court for good cause shown. See TrNN. R. App. P. 2 ("For good cause
. . .the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or Court of Criminal Appeals may
suspend the requirements or provisions of any of these rules .... ").See generally Theoretical Foundations, supra note 2, at 174-79. Appellate rule 3(e) itself
also makes clear that the requirement of a new-trial motion is merely a rule of
practice and not a jurisdictional limit that cannot be ignored. The last sentence
of rule 3(e) states in unmistakably clear terms that "[flailure of an appellant
to take any step other than the timely filing and service of a notice of appeal
does not affect the validity of the appeal but is grounds only for such action as
the appellate court deems appropriate." While the rule refers explicitly only to
an appellant, no sensible basis exists for construing rule 3(e) to permit the
appellate court to excuse an appellant's failure to move for a new trial but not
to permit the court to excuse the same omission by an appellee. As urged in the
text, however, the better approach is not to require the appellee to move for a
new trial, thus eliminating any need to invoke the appellate court's power to
excuse noncompliance.
21. See Theoretical Foundations, supra note 2, at 168-70.
22. If the trial court grants the new-trial motion, the party who originally
prevailed should not be required to make any sort of motion in order to urge on
a later appeal that the trial court erred in granting the new trial. Also, under
appellate rule 24(g), the party in whose favor judgment was originally entered
need not, although he may, prepare and file a transcript or statement of the
evidence or proceedings prior to the entry of an appealable judgment or order.
See ProceduralDetails, supra note 2, at 52-53. The grant of a new trial is an
interlocutory order, and an appeal as of right lies only after entry of judgment
after the second trial, although an interlocutory appeal by permission may be
sought from the order granting the new trial. For a discussion of the circumstances in which an interlocutory appeal by permission lies, see Theoretical Foundations, supra note 2, at 216-27. For a discussion of the details of how to take an
interlocutory appeal, see ProceduralDetails, supra note 2, at 15-18.

1979]

NEW APPELLATE RULES

Although under amended rule 3(e) a new-trial motion is a
prerequisite to review on the merits of the issues presented for
review in jury actions, reviewability should be distinguished from
the procedural requirements that must be satisfied to initiate a
valid appeal as of right. Under the rules the filing and service of
a notice of appeal are the only prerequisites to a valid appeal as
of right." Generally speaking, the notice of appeal must be filed
with the clerk of the trial court within thirty days after entry of
the judgment from which the appeal is taken. 4 Based on a recommendation of the Advisory Commission, rule 4(a) was redrafted
to provide in unambiguous terms that a notice of appeal is timely
filed only if it is actually received by the clerk of the trial court
within the thirty days allowed for filing." While filing of the notice may be accomplished by mail, under the revised rule the day
of mailing is not deemed the day of filing. 6 The notice must be
received by the clerk within the specified thirty-day period; if the
23. TENN. R. App. P. 3(e). If, for example, appellant in a jury case fails to
move for a new trial but timely files and serves notice of appeal, the appeal is
valid even though review on the merits of the issues presented for review will
generally be denied on the ground that the failure to incorporate the issues in a
new-trial motion constitutes a waiver of appellate review. The distinction is
important because the rule that appellant must file his notice of appeal on time
is jurisdictional and noncompliance cannot be excused, although in some circumstances an otherwise untimely appeal may be taken by first securing relief
from the judgment in the trial court. See Procedural Details, supra note 2, at
8-9. The requirement that appellant move for a new trial is merely a rule of
practice, and noncompliance may be excused in appropriate circumstances
under appellate rule 2. See note 20 supra.
24. TENN. R. APP. P. 4(a). See generally Procedural Details, supra note 2,
at 4-9.
25. As amended, TENN. R. APP. P. 4(a) provides that "the notice of appeal
shall be filed with and received by the clerk of the trial court within 30 days
after the date of entry of the judgment appealed from" (emphasis added).
26. Prior to the amendment of rule 4(a), none of the appellate rules explicitly stated whether actual receipt or the mere posting of a notice of appeal
constituted timely filing with the clerk of the trial court. While rule 20(a) originally provided that papers filed with the clerk shall be considered filed as of the
postmark, that rule is applicable only to the clerk of the appellate court, not to
the clerk of the trial court. Filing with the clerk of the trial court also is considered timely under the civil and criminal trial rules only if the papers are actually
received by the clerk within the allotted time. See TENN. R. CIv. P. 5.06; TENN.
R. CanM. P. 49(c).
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notice is not received on time, the appeal is invalid and will be
27
dismissed.
In a related vein, rule 20(a) was amended to make clear that
a filing of any paper with the clerk of the appellate court "shall
not be timely unless the papers are received by the clerk within
the time fixed for filing."28 The original draft of rule 20(a) provided that filing may be accomplished by mail and that the day
of mailing, "which may be evidenced by a postmark affixed in
and by a United States Post Office, shall be deemed the day of
filing if first class mail is utilized." The advantage of measuring
the date of filing from the postmark date would have been to
afford all parties, and not merely those conveniently located near
the office of the clerk of the appellate court, the maximum time
required or permitted for the preparation of papers. The disadvantage of the original draft stemmed from fact that, because
postmarks are often illegibile and because some items are lost in
the mail or misdelivered, disputes might have arisen concerning
whether a paper was filed on time. Such disputes would have
been relatively unimportant since for good cause shown the appellate court, in most instances, may. enlarge the time prescribed
in the rules for doing an act or may permit an act to be done after
the expiration of such time.29 Good cause would probably have
been found if a postmark were illegible or an item were lost in the
mail or misdelivered since a party should not be penalized for the
errors or omissions of those over whom he has no effective control.30 In some situations, however, disputes over whether certain
27. If notice of appeal is mailed sufficiently in advance of its due date but
the notice is lost or misdelivered through no fault of the appellant, he may
attempt to secure relief from the judgment under TENN. R. Civ. P. 60.02 or the
Post-Conviction Procedure Act. See TENN. ConE ANN. § 40-3820 (1975). However, since appellant has no guarantee such relief will be granted, prudent
counsel should ensure that the notice of appeal is actually received by the clerk
of the trial court on time.
28. This is in accord with prior law. See Lambert v. Home Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 481 S.W.2d 770, 773 (Tenn. 1972).
29. TENN. R. App. P. 21(b) provides: "For good cause shown the appellate
court may enlarge the time prescribed by these rules or by its order for doing
any act, or may permit an act to be done after the expiration of such time
...." TENN. R. App. P. 2 is a more general provision and permits the appellate
courts for good cause to "suspend the requirements or provisions of any of these
rules in a particular case" (emphasis added).
30. See, e.g., General Elec. Supply Co. v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 546
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papers were timely filed could have been vitally important since
the time for filing cannot be enlarged. Times that cannot be
enlarged include the time within which a party must file a notice
of appeal and the time for filing a petition for review of administrative proceedings in the court of appeals2 t Similarly, while the
time for filing an application for permission to appeal from an
intermediate appellate court to the state supreme court may be
extended an additional thirty days as a result of an amendment
made in the rules after their submission to the legislature, the
request for an extension must be made within the original thirtyday period and the extension cannot exceed thirty days." Even
S.W.2d 210, 214 (Tenn. 1977).
31. While appellate rules 2 and 21(b) generally empower the appellate
courts to permit the late filing of any paper, see note 29 supra, both rules
expressly prohibit the appellate courts from extending the time prescribed in
rule 4 for filing a notice of appeal, the time prescribed in rule 11 for filing an
application for permission to appeal, or the time prescribed in rule 12 for filing
a petition for review.
32. As amended and approved, TENN. R. Ap. P. 11(b) provides:
The application for permission to appeal shall be filed with the
clerk of the Supreme Court within 30 days after the entry of the judgment of the Court of Appeals or Court of Criminal Appeals if no petition for rehearing is filed or, if a petition for rehearing is filed, within
30 days after the denial of the petition or entry of the judgment on
rehearing; provided, however, that an extension of not more than an
additional 30 days may be granted by the court, or a justice thereof,
upon motion and for good cause shown. No extension beyond said
additional 30 day period shall be permitted, and any motion for an
extension must be made before expiration of the initial 30 day period.
In addition to permitting a 30-day extension, TENN. R. App. P. ll(b) establishes
a uniform 30-day period for filing an application for permission to appeal with
the state supreme court. The unamended version of the rule allowed only 15
days for filing the application if a petition for rehearing was filed in the intermediate appellate court. See ProceduralDetails, supra note 2, at 18. Although the
amended rule does not specify which court may grant the extension, the new
rule is probably to be read as following the prior law, under which extensions
for filing for certiorari were sought in the supreme court. See TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 16-452 (Cui. Supp. 1978); id. § 27-820 (1955).
TENN. R. App. P. 49 provides that the new rules govern all appellate proceedings brought after July 1, 1979, and also all further procedure in proceedings
then pending except to the extent that in the opinion of the appellate court
application of the new rules in a particular proceeding would not be feasible or
would work an injustice. In such an instance the procedure followed before the
effective date of the new rules applies. Since the new rules are generally less
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with regard to these peculiarly significant time periods, most of
the anticipated problems of making the postmark date the date
of filing could have been alleviated by requiring that envelopes
be postmarked by hand and by requiring that certified or registered, return-receipt mail be utilized. Perhaps a better approach
would have been to fashion a rule similar to Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 25(a), which requires that some papers be
received by the clerk within the time fixed for filing while others
need only be mailed within the allotted time. 33 For example, the
rules could have required actual receipt of those papers for which
the time for filing cannot be enlarged or for which an extension
must be sought within the period normally provided for filing,
while permitting other papers to be considered filed as of the
postmark date." Be that as it may, under the amended version
of appellate rule 20(a) all papers must be received by the clerk of
the appellate court within the time fixed in order to be considered
filed on time, although late filing may be excused by the appel3
late court in all but three situations. 5
While the appellate rules make no step other than the timely
restrictive than prior law, they will in most cases govern further procedure in
pending appellate proceedings without working an injustice. TENN. R. App. P.
11(b), however, is more restrictive than prior law. New rule 11 allows only 30
days for filing an application for permission to appeal (the counterpart under
the new rules to the petition for certiorari) and allows only a 30-day extension
if the extension is sought within the original 30-day period. Prior law allowed
45 days for filing a petition for certiorari and allowed a 45-day extension. See
TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-452 (Cum. Supp. 1978); id. § 27-820 (1955). Thus the
maximum time for filing under rule 11 is 60 days as compared to the maximum
time of 90 days previously permitted for filing for certiorari. Presumably all
appeals to the supreme court in which judgments are entered by the intermediate appellate courts after July I are governed by new rule 11. The shorter period
for filing specified in rule 11 should therefore be strictly adhered to in order to
ensure the possibility of supreme court review of the final decision of an intermediate appellate court.
33. FED. R. App. P. 25(a) provides that "filing shall not be timely unless
the papers are received by the clerk within the time fixed for filing, except that
briefs and appendices shall be deemed filed on the day of mailing if the most
expeditious form of delivery by mail, excepting special delivery, is utilized."
34. Permitting any paper to be filed according to its postmark may cause
some practical difficulties for the clerks of the appellate courts. Letter from John
A. Parker to Mr. Justice William J. Harbison (Dec. 14, 1978) (on file with the
author).
35. See note 31 supra.
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filing and service of a notice of appeal a prerequisite to a valid
appeal as of right, under an amendment to civil trial rule 62 an
appellant may obtain a stay of execution in actions for money or
property only by giving security for the judgment in full, interest,
damages for delay, and costs on appeal?' The trial court, however, is given a substantial amount of discretion in rule 62 to
require less than the full amount of security or to require no
security at all depending upon the circumstances of the particular
case.37 Based on a recommendation of the Advisory Commission,
appellate rule 7(a) was amended to provide that any party, and
not just the party seeking entry of the stay order, may obtain
summary review of an order entered pursuant to rule 62,u The
procedure for seeking review under appellate rule 7(a) is by way
of a simple motion for review made in the appellate court to
which the appeal has been taken. As a prerequisite to review, a
written motion for the relief sought on review must first be presented to the trial court unless such a motion is not practicable."
36. See Procedural Details, supra note 2, at 25-31; Theoretical Foundations, supra note 2, at 235-41.
37. TENN. R. Civ. P. 62.05 provides:
A party may obtain a stay without giving any security or without giving
the full amount of the security required by this Rule upon motion and,
if not previously presented, upon presentation of an itemized and verified statement of his financial condition. If the motion is granted, the
party may obtain a stay by giving such security as the court deems
proper based upon the party's financial condition.
38. Before amendment, appellate rule 7(a) provided that application for
a stay pending appeal, or for approval of a bond staying execution, or for an
order suspending relief or granting additional or modified relief pending appeal
may be reviewed by motion in the appellate court to which the appeal has been
taken. As amended, TENN. R. Arp. P. 7(a) provides that "[any party may
obtain review of an order entered pursuant to rule 62 of the Tennessee Rules of
Civil Procedure."
Orders other than those entered pursuant to rule 62 that may result in
irreparable injury or otherwise prevent the appellate court from granting complete relief on appeal after entry of a final judgment may be reviewed by means
of an interlocutory appeal taken pursuant to appellate rules 9 or 10. For a
discussion of the details of taking an interlocutory appeal, see ProceduralDetails, supra note 2, at 15-18.
39. See 9 MooRE's FvDMAL PRACTICE 1 208.07, at 1424 (2d ed. 1975): "[AJ
showing of impracticability would normally require a showing that the [triall
judge is unavailable, or that relief to be effective must be immediate and that
in the nature of what occurred in the [trial] court relief from it is improbable."
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The motion for review in the appellate court is to be accompanied
by a copy of the motion filed in the trial court, any answer in
opposition thereto, and any written statement of reasons given by
the trial court for its action. The motion for review itself must
identify the court that entered the order and must state the date
of the order, the substance of the order (including the amount of
bond or other conditions of the stay of execution), the facts relied
on (including the facts showing relief in the trial court is not
practicable if a motion for the relief sought on review has not been
presented to the trial court), the arguments supporting the motion, and the relief sought. If the facts relied on are subject to
dispute, the motion is to be supported by affidavits or other sworn
statements. Review is had without briefs and after reasonable
notice to the other parties,"0 who are to be served with a copy of
the motion for review. The other parties may promptly file an
answer. The appellate court, either on its own motion or on motion of a party, may order preparation of a transcript of all proceedings had in the trial court on the question of stay of execution. According to the concluding sentence of appellate rule 7(a),
review by the appellate court shall be completed promptly.
Civil trial rule 62, which pertains to stays, was itself
amended in one noteworthy respect. Before amendment, rule
62.05 simply provided that security for a stay of execution shall
be conditioned to secure "the judgment in full" plus interest,
damages for delay, and costs on appeal. Some judgments do not
direct the payment of a lump sum of money but direct the payment of money in periodic installments." The question therefore
arises concerning the amount of security required by the
"judgment in full" language. To cover this situation, the state
supreme court revised rule 62.05(1) to provide that in cases directing the payment of money in periodic installments, the security required to stay execution "shall be fixed in such manner as
the [trial] court shall deem sufficient." In determining the
amount of security that should be considered sufficient in any
40. TENN. R. APP. P. 7(a) neither expressly requires nor prohibits oral
argument on the motion. On the other hand, rule 8, dealing with review of
release decisions in criminal cases, states that "[nlo oral argument shall be
permitted except when ordered on the court's own motion."
41. Examples are alimony and child support payments as well as certain
benefits payable under the worker's compensation statute.
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particular case, the court should keep in mind that one purpose
of the security requirement is to give the appellee some assurance
that the judgment will be expeditiously satisfied and that he will
42
be made whole for any damages caused by the delay on appeal.
Accordingly, the security ought to be conditioned to secure the
payment of such installments as become due during the pendency
of the appeal as well as interest, damages for delay, and costs on
appeal. The amount of security should not be entirely openended, however, and a maximum figure of recovery on the bond
should be specified so that the surety knows the possible extent
of his liability at the time security is provided. 3 If the trial court's
estimate of the number of installments that will become due
before the appellate process is brought to a conclusion is too high,
then the surety would be liable only for such amounts as actually
become due. If, however, the trial court's estimate is too low, then
the surety would be liable only for the maximum figure set by the
court."
In criminal cases, the concern that parallels the problem of
stay of execution in civil cases is release of the defendant pending
appeal after conviction. The Release from Custody and Bail Reform Act of 19771' governs the availability and conditions of release in all but a few situations." The appellate rules are relevant
42. See generally Theoretical Foundations, supra note 2, at 240-41.
43. Cf. 73 HARV. L. REv. 333, 343 (1959) (court should specify maximum
amount recoverable on interlocutory injunction bond so plaintiff may know
possible extent of his liability). See also Dobbs, Should Security Be Required
as a Pre-Conditionto ProvisionalInjunctive Relief?, 52 N.C.L. Rav. 1091 (1974).
44. If the trial court's estimate proves to be so low as to imperil the security to which appellee is entitled, he should be permitted to move for an order
requiring appellant to post additional security. Alternatively, if the trial court's
estimate proves to be unreasonably high, appellant should also be permitted to
move for a reduction in the required security. TIN. R. Civ. P. 62.08 would seem
sufficient to empower the appellate court to increase or decrease the required
security during the pendency of the appeal. That rule provides:
Nothing in this Rule [62] shall be construed to limit the power of an
appellate court or a judge thereof to stay proceedings or to suspend
relief or grant whatever additional or modified relief is deemed appropriate during the pendency of an appeal or to make any order appropriate to preserve the status quo or the effectiveness of any judgment that
may subsequently be entered.
45. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-1201 to 1244 (Cum. Supp. 1978). as amended
by 1979 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 318, § 16.
46. Additional provisions governing release are TENN. CoD ANN. §§ 401245 to 1247, -3406 to 3407, -3408 (1975). TXNN. R. CaM. P. 32(c) is also relevant.
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to the release problem only insofar as they establish the procedural framework for the assertion of those rights detailed by statute. 7 To fill a gap that existed in the earlier version of the appellate rules, the state supreme court added rule 8(c) to cover the
situation in which a defendant's conviction has been affirmed by
the court of criminal appeals but a further review of the conviction is to be sought in the state supreme court. Under rule 8(c),
upon affirmance of the conviction of a defendant in the court of
criminal appeals and pending both the filing and disposition of
an application for permission to appeal to the state supreme court
under rule 11, "the defendant may be admitted to bail on bond
. . .upon such terms and under such conditions as shall be fixed
by the Court of Criminal Appeals." 4 ' Since review by the supreme
court will rarely be available, the court of criminal appeals can
be expected to increase the required bond.4' The bond should be
conditioned on a requirement that the defendant file his application for permission to appeal within the time specified in rule 11
and on a requirement that he surrender himself if the application
is not filed on time or if it is denied.w Although rule 8(c) speaks
only of release to bail "on bond," the rule probably should not be
read to preclude release on any other conditions of release that
are deemed satisfactory by the court of criminal appeals."
47.
48.

See ProceduralDetails, supra note 2, at 31-35.
TENN.CODE ANN. § 40-1213 (Cum. Supp. 1978) provides: "In the cases

in which defendant may be admitted to bail . . .the order admitting him to

bail may be made either by the court wherein the judgment was rendered, or
the judge thereof, by the Court of Criminal Appeals, or by the Supreme Court."
49. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-1213 (Cum.Supp. 1978) provides:
ITn any case in which any person has been admitted to bail following
his arrest or indictment such bail bond, security or cash deposit shall
continue and be valid and binding pending any appellate review, and
no additional or new bail shall be required unless ordered by the court
wherein the judgment of the conviction was rendered, or the judge
thereof, or by the Court of Criminal Appeals or by the Supreme Court.
50. Rule 8(c) explicitly provides that release may be ordered by the court
of criminal appeals "pending the filing" of an application for permission to
appeal to the state supreme court under rule 11. The defendant, therefore, need
not be incarcerated until an application for permission to appeal is filed. In one
grand division the current practice of incarcerating the defendant until his
counsel has filed a petition for certiorari only encourages counsel to file hastily
drawn petitions.
51. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-1216 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
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Three other amendments to the rules involving appeals in
criminal cases may be conveniently discussed at this point. First,
in response to a recommendation of the court of criminal appeals,
the Advisory Commission deleted a provision from rule 3(b) that
permitted a defendant to appeal as of right from any order modifying the conditions of probation. As amended, rule 3(b) permits
the defendant an appeal as of right only with regard to those
probation orders that either deny probation or revoke it. Although
the amended rule will certainly achieve its desired objective of
eliminating appeals of orders modifying the! conditions of probation, the desirability of that objective is itgelf questionable. Foreclosure of appellate review seems to accord insufficient consideration to a defendant's vital liberty interest."
The rules relating to criminal appeals were also amended
with regard to the motions that terminate the time for filing
notice of appeal. While notice of appeal must generally be filed
within thirty days after entry of judgment," certain specified
timely motions in the trial court terminate the running of the
time within which notice of appeal must be filed. 4 As noted in
the Advisory Commission comment to rule 4, "it would be unde52. In addition to appeals as of right, the rules permit an appellant in
some circumstances to take an appeal by permission. See generally Procedural
Details, supra note 2, at 15-21; Theoretical Foundations,supra note 2, at 21627. As the name implies, an appeal by permission, unlike an appeal as of right,
is available only if permission to appeal is granted by the trial or appellate court.
Under rule 9, one reason for permitting an appeal by permission is "the need to
prevent irreparable injury, giving considerhtion to the severity of the potential
injury, the probability of its occurrence, and the probability that review upon
entry of a final judgment will be ineffective." Also, under rule 10 an appeal by
permission may be taken "if the lower court has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to require immediate review."
The principal difference between these rules is that an appeal by permission
under rule 9 requires the permission of both the trial and appellate courts, while
an appeal under rule 10 may be taken on the permission of the appellate court
alone. Although the matter is not free from doubt, a defendant arguably may
appeal an order of the trial court modifying the conditions of his probation under
rule 9 if he will suffer irreparable injury if an appeal is not allowed, or under
rule 10 if he can demonstrate that the trial court acted in an arbitrary fashion
in modifying his probation. The availability of review under rules 9 or 10 would
have the advantage of permitting appellate review when it is most needed without making review routinely available.
53.

TENN. R. App. P. 4 (a).

54. Id. R. 4(b)-4(c).
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sirable to proceed with the appeal while the trial court has before
it a motion the granting of which would vacate or alter the judgment appealed from, and which might affect either the availability of or the decision whether to seek appellate review." Before
amendment of the rules, the only motions in criminal actions that
terminated the running of the time for filing notice of appeal were
a motion under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a) for
a new trial and a motion under rule 34 for arrest of judgment, as
well as a timely petition under rule 32(f)(1) for a suspended sentence. Motions for a judgment of acquittal were not initially included among those motions that terminate the running of the
time for filing notice of appeal. In light of the purpose of delaying
appellate review until the trial court has disposed of motions
pending before it, rule 4(c) was amended to provide that the
making of a timely motion for a judgment of acquittal under
criminal rule 29(c) also terminates the running of the time for
filing notice of appeal.1
Finally, the state supreme court amended rule 13(e), which
sets forth the standard of review for findings of guilt in criminal
actions. In its earliest version, rule 13(e) simply adopted the traditional rule in Tennessee that findings of guilt are set aside on
appeal only if the evidence preponderates against the finding."
As a result of some recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court, 7 rule 13(e) was initially amended to provide that
55. A motion for judgment of acquittal under criminal rule 29(c) is made
after the jury returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned
a verdict. The motion may also be made at the close of the evidence offered by
the state or at the close of all the evidence. See TENN. R.CitM. P. 29(a)-29(b).
56. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 14(7), 218 Tenn. 817 (1967): "No assignments
or [sic] error can be based on the facts, in criminal cases, unless the testimony
preponderates in favor of the innocence of the plaintiff in error, and against the
verdict of guilty found by the jury ......
57. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978); Greene v. Massey, 437
U.S. 19 (1978). The Supreme Court in Burks held that under the double jeopardy clause an accused may not be subjected to a second trial if his conviction
is reversed by an appellate court solely for lack of sufficient evidence to sustain
the jury's verdict. This holding was applied to a state-court conviction in
Greene. As noted in the Advisory Commission comment to rule 13(e), the Court
did not expressly address the standard governing appellate reversal on the
ground of insufficient evidence. Due process, however, would seem to require
that an appellate court review the whole record to ascertain whether the trier
of fact could reasonably find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
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"[flindings of guilt in criminal actions whether by the trial court
or jury shall be set aside if, considering the whole record, the
evidence fails to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Apparently the court of criminal appeals considered this standard
of review too exacting and likely to result in the setting aside of
an excessive number of convictions. Accordingly, the state supreme court amended rule 13(e) again, so that it now provides
that "[flindings of guilt in criminal actions whether by the trial
court or jury shall be set aside if the evidence, is insufficient to
support the finding by the trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
One clear difference between the current version of rule 13(e)
and its immediate predecessor is that the rule no longer expressly
requires consideration of the whole record. That difference may
well be more accidental than intentional. The criticism by the
court of criminal appeals was not directed at the requirement
that the whole record be considered but rather at the standard of
review. Moreover, for an appellate court to consider only the evidence supporting the finding of guilt would be undesirable. As
Justice Traynor has observed in a more general context:
Occasionally an appellate court affirms the trier of facts on isolated evidence torn from the context of the whole record. Such
a court leaps from an acceptable premise, that a trier of fact
could reasonably believe the isolated evidence, to the dubious
conclusion that the trier of fact reasonably rejected everything
that controverted the isolated evidence. Had the appellate court
examined the whole record, it might have found that a reasonable trier of fact could not have made the finding in issue. One
of the very purposes of review is to uncover just such irrational
findings and thus preclude the risk of affirming
a finding that
u
should be disaffirmed as a matter of law.
The only other difference between the current version of rule
13(e) and its immediate predecessor is that the former requires a
finding of guilt to be set aside "if the evidence is insufficient to
See Theoretical Foundations,supra note 2, at 216 n.299; cf. Jackson v. Virginia,
99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979) (federal court in habeas corpus proceeding must consider
whether there is sufficient evidence to justify a rational trier of fact to find guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt).
58.

ted).

R. TRANo,

THE

RIDDLE OF HARmLnsS

ERROR 27 (1970) (footnote omit-
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support the finding by the trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt," whereas the latter required that a finding of guilt be
set aside "if . . . the evidence fails to establish guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt." This difference is not merely semantic, but is
intended to make clear that "it is not for an appellate court to
retry cases on appeal or to substitute its judgment of the probabilities for that of the trier of fact, whatever it may find in the
record."" Reversal is appropriate, at least when the finding of
guilt is based on the opportunity of the trier of fact to assess the
credibility of witnesses who appeared personally before it," only
if, considering the whole record, no trier of fact could reasonably
find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." If rule
13(e) is so construed, it will require reversal of convictions only
infrequently, while at the same time assuring that measure of
appellate scrutiny that is properly the province of an appellate
court and to which the defendant is fairly entitled. 2
The most significant changes in the rules that remain to be
discussed, and by far the most numerous of all the amendments,
relate to the record on appeal." The rules concerning the record
as formulated by the Advisory Commission were designed to work
without judicial supervision unless the parties were unable to
agree concerning the content of the record on appeal." Under the
Advisory Commission's proposal, it was not necessary for the re59. Id.
60. See ABA COMMISSION

ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STAN-

§ 3.11, at 23 (1977); R. TRAYNOR, supra
note 58, at 20-21; Chestnut, Analysis of Proposed New Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 22 A.B.A.J. 533, 540 (1936); Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the
Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRAcUsE L. Ryv. 635, 663-65 (1971);
Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751,
DARDS RELATING TO APPELLATn COUnTS

781-82 (1957).

61. See generally Theoretical Foundations,supra note 2, at 203-16.
62. Such a construction of rule 13(e) would also accord the defendant the
measure of review due process ought to require. See note 57 supra.
63. See generally ProceduralDetails, supra note 2, at 35-69; Theoretical
Foundations, supra note 2, at 242-51.
64. One author has observed that, if the attorneys on both sides agree that
the bill of exceptions correctly states the proceedings and the evidence, the
requirement that the trial court approve the bill "is ordinarily only a waste of
the time, the energy

. . . or

whatever else is needed to get the paper to the judge,

as his signature follows in such a case as a matter of course." Wicker, supra note
10, at 677.
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cord on appeal to be approved by the trial court. The state supreme court rejected the Commission's recommendation in this
regard. As revised by the supreme court, rule 24(e) preserves the
requirement" that the trial court approve the transcript or statement of the evidence and authenticate the exhibits." The rule
directs the trial judge to approve the transcript or statement and
to authenticate the exhibits "as soon as practicable after the
filing thereof,"' 7 and, in any event, no later than forty-five days
after filing of the transcript or statement." In a commendable
attempt to honor the Advisory Commission's purpose in eliminating any requirement of approval of the record, the supreme court
provided in rule 24(e) that if the trial court fails to approve and
authenticate the specified portions of the record on appeal within
the forty-five day period, "the transcript or statement of the evidence and the exhibits shall be deemed to have been approved
65. But see TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-109 (Cum. Supp. 1978). While the bill
of exceptions had to be filed within the statutorily prescribed period of time,
the trial court could approve the bill any time thereafter. See id. § 27-111,
construed in Arnold v. Carter, 555 S.W.2d 721 (Tenn. 1977). For a discussion of
Arnold and a related case, see Sobieski, A Survey of Civil Procedurein Tennessee-1977, 46 TENN. L. Rav. 271, 375-78 (1979).
66. As a result of its decision to retain the requirement that the trial court
approve the transcript or statement of the evidence and authenticate the exhibits, the state supreme court also deleted a provision from rule 24 that permitted
the parties to file an agreed statement as the record on appeal. For a discussion
of the agreed statement, see ProceduralDetails, supra note 2, at 47-48. Deletion
of this provision is not particularly significant since the comparable provision
in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure is rarely utilized and the same
would probably have been true under the new rules. See 9 MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRAcE 210.07, at 1635 (2d ed. 1975); Godbold, Twenty Pages and TwentyMinutes-Effective Advocacy on Appeal, 30 Sw. L.J. 801, 806 (1976).
67. This is in accord with prior law. See TENN. CODE ANN, § 27-111 (Cum.
Supp. 1978). The current statute does not set a maximum time within which
the trial court must act, as does the revised version of rule 24(e).
68. The rule states that the record should be approved "as soon as practicable after the filing thereof or after the expiration of the 15-day period for
objections by appellee, as the case may be." Normally, the trial court should
not approve the record prior to expiration of the 15 days appellee is granted for
filing objections to the transcript or statement of the evidence filed by appellant.
See TENN. R. Anp. P. 24(b)-24(c); ProceduralDetails, supra note 2, at 45-47. If,
however, appellant has secured appellee's approval of the transcript or statement prior to filing it, the trial court may appropriately approve the record
within the 15-day period for objections by appellee.
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and shall be so considered by the appellate court, except in cases
where such approval did not occur by reason of the death or
inability to act of the trial judge." Although the phrase "inability
to act" is not defined, it would seem to include any physical or
mental illness or infirmity or other prolonged absence for any
reason. In cases in which the trial judge, because of death or
inability to act, does not approve the record, rule 24(e) provides
that "a successor or replacement judge of the court in which the
case was tried shall perform the duties of the trial judge, including approval of the record or the granting of any other appropriate
relief, or the ordering of a new trial."'" The de-emphasis of the
importance of approval of the record by the trial judge reflected
in revised rule 24(e) suggests that if the parties agree concerning
the content of the record on appeal, it should be approved by a
successor or replacement judge as a matter of course. 0
Another significant change concerning the record on appeal
originated with the Advisory Commission. In its original form,
rule 25 provided that the record on appeal would remain in the
trial court until the parties completed their briefs.7 ' The purpose
of retaining the record in the trial court was to serve the convenience of parties who may be far removed from the office of the
clerk of the appellate court. However, largely because of a realistic assessment of the heavier workload of the trial court clerks and
a desire to promote centralized control of appellate records, rule
25 was revised to conform to the longstanding practice, under
which the record on appeal is transmitted to the clerk of the
appellate court as soon as it is complete for purposes of the appeal. To accommodate this change, rule 29(a) was amended to
provide that the appellant's thirty-day period for filing and serving his brief runs from the date on which the record is filed with
the appellate court, and not from the date on which the record is
69. This is in accord with prior law. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-118 (1955).
Rule 24 does not address the distinguishable problem of the appropriate relief
if the trial judge dies or is unable to act prior to ruling on a motion for a new
trial or other similar post-trial motion. See id. § 17-117.
70. Even if the parties are unable to agree, the trial judge should approve
the record "if, after hearing, he shall find that it fairly states the truth of the
case." Id. § 17-118.
71. See Procedural Details, supra note 2, at 55-57.
72. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-322 (Cure. Supp. 1978); Tenn. Sup. Ct. R.
6, 218 Tenn. 809 (1967); Tenn. Ct. App. R. 7, 57 Tenn. App. 807 (1967).
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completed as the rule originally provided. Under rule 26(a), the
clerk of the appellate court must, as soon as the record is filed,
notify the parties of the date the record was filed.
The final significant change concerning the record on appeal
is found in rule 25(d). Before amendment, rule 25 put the burden

on the appellant to seek an extension of time if the clerk of the
trial court is unable to complete the record on appeal within the
allotted thirty-day period after the filing of the transcript or
statement of the evidence. Current rule 25(d) places the burden
for seeking an extension on the clerk of the trial court, who seeks
the extension from the appellate court to which the appeal has
been taken. The practical effect of this amendment is to relieve
the appellant of the burden of ensuring that the record is completed on time. 5 The appellant simply needs to file the transcript
or statement of the evidence on time and take whatever other
action is necessary to enable the clerk to complete the record.
73. See ProceduralDetails, supra note 2, at 55.
74. A proposed amendment to FED. R. APP. P. 11(b) would effect a similar
change in federal practice with regard to preparation and filing of the transcript.
As amended, FED. R. APP. P. 11(b) would provide:
Upon receipt of an order for a transcript, the reporter shall acknowledge
at the foot of the order the fact that he has received it and the date on
which he expects to have the transcript completed and shall transmit
the order, so endorsed, to the clerk of the court of appeals. If the transcript cannot be completed within 30 days of receipt of the order the
reporter shall request an extension of time from the clerk of the court
of appeals and the action of the clerk of the court of appeals shall be
entered on the docket and the parties notified. In the event of the
failure of the reporter to file the transcript within the time allowed, the
clerk of the court of appeals shall notify the district judge and take such
other steps as may be directed by the court of appeals. Upon completion of the transcript the reporter shall file the transcript with the clerk
of the district court and shall notify the clerk of the court of appeals
that he has done so.
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELMINARY

DRAFT

FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE

12-13 (1977).

75. The burden of ensuring that the record is completed on time is appropriately that of the clerk of the trial court since the appellant has no control over
the time within which the record will be completed. Placing the burden for
seeking an extension on the clerk and lodging the decision whether to grant the
extension with the appellate court may also have the desirable effect of prompting the clerk to complete the record within the period specified in rule 25(a).
76. See ProceduralDetails, supra note 2, at 53-54.
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Dismissal of the appeal under revised rule 26(d) is permitted only
if the appellant fails to file the transcript or statement within the
ninety-day period specified in rules 24(b) and 24(b).1 Virtually
all steps after filing of the transcript or statement are now the responsibility of the clerk of the trial court, 5 and rule 26(b) empha77. Prior to amendment, rule 26(b) permitted dismissal of an appeal if
appellant failed to discharge his responsibility to cause timely completion or
transmission of the record, Since under the revised rules transmission of the
record occurs as soon as it is complete for purposes of the appeal, that portion
of the earlier version of rule 26 was no longer needed. Similarly, placing the
burden on the clerk of the trial court to see that the record is completed on time
rendered the remaining portion of the original rule unnecessary.
While rule 26(b) as revised permits dismissal of an appeal only if appellant
fails to file the transcript or statement of the evidence on time, dismissal might
also be urged on the ground appellant has failed to file proof of service of the
notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court. Rule 25(a) provides that the
clerk will not assemble, number, or complete the record if proof of service of the
notice of appeal has not been filed. Although rule 2 permits an appellate court
to excuse the failure to file proof of service of the notice of appeal, that rule
requires a showing of good cause. Yet, the only effect of a delay in completion
and transmission of the record is that appellant gains some additional time for
serving and filing his brief. As previously urged:
Perhaps the most desirable solution is to extend the time for completing the record but also to abridge the time within which the appellant
must file and serve his brief. This solution seems consistent with the
spirit of rule 3(e), which provides that failure of an appellant to take
any step other than the timely filing and service of a notice of appeal
does not affect its validity but is ground only for such action as is
appropriate.
ProceduralDetails, supra note 2, at 60. Noncompliance with the service requirement itself, as opposed to the requirement of filing proof of service, is also
excusable. See id. at 10-11; Theoretical Foundations, supra note 2, at 190-91.
78. Under rule 2 even the failure to file the transcript or statement of the
evidence on time may be excused for good cause. Good cause would almost
always seem to be present if noncompliance with the rules is no fault of the
appellant but results instead from the inadvertence of those over whom the
appellant has no control. See, e.g., General Elec. Supply Co. v. Arlen Realty &
Dev. Corp., 546 S.W.2d 210, 214 (Tenn. 1977). If, for example, the court reporter
died or were otherwise unable to complete the transcript on time, appellant
would have good cause to seek an extension of time for filing the transcript, at
least if the transcript was ordered promptly after filing notice of appeal. See
Procedural Details, supra note 2, at 45. Under prior law, the appellate court
could not permit the bill of exceptions in a civil case to be filed beyond the time
specified in TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-11 (Cum. Supp. 1978). In criminal cases the
court of criminal appeals and the supreme court could for good cause at any time
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sizes the principle that dismissal of an appeal is not authorized
for the errors or omissions of the clerk of the trial court."
In addition to the changes already noted, a number of other
miscellaneous and largely technical amendments were incorporated into the appellate rules. These matters have been relegated
to the accompanying footnote." Of greater significance are three
order the filing of the bill of exceptions "so as to give the appellate court jurisdiction to consider the same." Id.
79. TENN. R. App. P. 26(b) provides: "Nothing in this subdivision shall be
construed to authorize dismissal of an appeal due to the errors or omissions of
the clerk of the trial court." This provision is of lesser significance under the
approved version of the rules, which require the clerk of the trial court to seek
an extension if he is unable to complete the record on time. Under the earlier
version the appellant was required to seek the extension, and rule 26(b) was
designed to ensure that the appellant would not be penalized for the derelictions
of the clerk. See ProceduralDetails, supra note 2, at 65-66.
80. Rule 4(b) deals in part with the problem that arises if notice of appeal
is filed prematurely. One such situation arises if notice is filed after entry of
judgment but prior to the filing of a later timely motion in the trial court that
terminates the time for filing notice of appeal. See ProceduralDetails, supra
note 2, at 5-8. Originally rule 4(b) provided that "[a] notice of appeal filed
before the filing of any of the [enumerated] motions shall have no effect." The
amended version of the rule provides that a notice of appeal filed before the
filing "or disposition" of the enumerated motions shall have no effect.
Rules 9, 10, and 11 were amended to specify when the clerk of the appellate
court should docket appeals taken under those rules. The earlier versions did
not treat the question. As amended, rule 9(e) provides that the clerk shall docket
an appeal under that rule upon entry of the order granting permission to appeal;
rule 10(b) provides that the appeal shall be docketed upon the filing of the
application for an extraordinary appeal with the clerk of the appellate court;
and rule 11(e) provides that the clerk shall docket the appeal under that rule
upon entry of the order granting permission to appeal.
Rule 14(a) was amended in one minor respect. That rule permits the appellate courts to consider post-judgment facts in certain enumerated circumstances. See ProceduralDetails, supra note 2, at 66-67; Theoretical Foundations,
supra note 2, at 200-02. To emphasize that the enumerated circumstances are
not an exclusive listing of facts that may be considered, rule 14(a) now provides
that consideration "generally" will extend only to those facts mentioned in the
rule. The Advisory Commission comment still clearly indicates, however, that
rule 14 "is not intended to permit a retrial in the appellate court."
Rule 15(b), which governs voluntary dismissals in the appellate court, was
amended by adding an introductory phrase to emphasize that the filing of the
record in the appellate court activates that court's authority to enter an order
voluntarily dismissing an appeal. Also, the penultimate sentence was amended
by deleting a phrase referring to voluntary dismissals on motion of the appellant
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provisions the state supreme court deleted from the rules. One of
"or moving party." The moving party will invariably be the appellant as that
term is used and defined in the rules.
Rule 19(b), which deals with substitution for causes other than death, originally referred to "substitution of a party in the appellate court by reason of...
death." However, substitution rendered necessary by reason of death is treated
explicitly in rule 19(a), and the redundant inclusion of death in rule 19(b) was
eliminated.
A grammatical error was eliminated from rule 24(a) by changing the singular of the word "summons" to the plural "summonses."
The duty of the clerk to make the record available to the parties so that
they may prepare appellate papers is treated in rule 25(c), which was amended
in three respects. As a result of the decision to transmit the record to the clerk
of the appellate court as soon as it is complete for purposes of the appeal, the
rule was amended to impose the duty to make the record available on the clerk
of the appellate court, not the clerk of the trial court as the rule originally
provided. A provision stating that the record may be made available to a party
by the clerk "without the necessity of obtaining an order of the . . . court" was
deleted as not having been necessary. Finally, the rule was amended by adding
a provision permitting the clerk and the parties to send the record, one to
another, "by prepaid mail or.parcel delivery service." Before the addition of the
quoted language the clerk was directed to send the record to a party, charges
collect, and this method of delivery remains permissible under the amended
rule. Personal delivery is also authorized by rule 25(c).
No substantive change was made in rule 28, which deals with preparation
of an optional appendix to the briefs, but the sentence originally appearing as
the second sentence of subdivision (a) was moved to subdivision (d), where it
now appears as the third sentence.
Rule 38, which deals with the responsibility of the clerk of the appellate
court to notify the parties of entry of judgment, was amended to make it conform
with prior practice. That rule originally required the clerk, on the day judgment
is entered, to mail to the parties the judgment itself as well as the opinion of
the appellate court and notice of the date of entry of the judgment. The current
rule simply requires the clerk to mail the opinion and notice of the date of entry
of the judgment; the judgment itself will not be sent to the parties.
Rule 39(a), which deals with rehearings, was amended by substituting the
word "opinion" for the word "decision" in the four places it appears in that rule.
The same change was made in rule 38.
Subdivisions (c), (d), and (f)of rule 40 were all amended in the same
fashion. In their original form those subdivisions included among the recoverable costs on appeal "the cost of producing" briefs and certain other papers. As
amended, the rule expresses the intention of the original rule more clearly by
stating that a party may recover "the cost of producing necessary copies of' the
designated papers.
A new last sentence added to rule 42(a) provides that the clerk of the
appellate court is responsible for collecting his fees. In all other respects, however, execution issues not from the appellate court but from the trial court in
which the action was brought. See ProceduralDetails, supra note 2, at 100-01.
Rule 42(a) was also extensively amended with respect to the time the clerk
transmits the mandate from the appellate court to the trial court. The rule
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the rules would have altered the current practice of calling civil
appeals for argument on a county-by-county basis;"' deletion of
the Commission's recommendation leaves the county-by-county
rule intact. The supreme court also deleted a rule that would have
permitted the court to amend the appellate rules without legislative approval.81 Finally, the court deleted proposed rule 37, which
originally provided that the mandate is transmitted 31 days after entry of judgment unless the court orders otherwise. That remains true with regard to the
mandates of the intermediate appellate courts, but under the amended version
of rule 42(a) mandates of the supreme court are transmitted 11 days after entry
of judgment unless the court orders otherwise. The principle of amended rule
42(a) is that the mandate of an intermediate court should not issue until the
time for applying to the supreme court for review has expired and the mandate
of the supreme court should not issue until the time for petitioning for rehearing
has expired. See ProceduralDetails, supra note 2, at 101. Since TENN. R. APP.
P. 39(b) requires a petition for rehearing to be filed within 10 days after entry
of judgment, the original rule provided an excessive amount of time before a
mandate would issue from the state supreme court. In cases in which still further
review may be sought in the Supreme Court of the United States, either the
appellate court whose decision is sought to be reviewed or a judge thereof or the
Supreme Court of Tennessee or a justice thereof may stay the mandate. TENN.
R. App. P. 42(c); see Procedural Details, supra note 2, at 101-02.
Finally, the revision of civil trial rule 62.05 was itself amended to state more
clearly the procedure to be utilized if a party seeks a reduction in the amount
of security required to stay execution. For a discussion of the amended rule, see
ProceduralDetails, supra note 2, at 27-28.
81. See ProceduralDetails, supra note 2, at 86-87.
82. The purpose of the rule was to facilitate amendment of the appellate
rules. Apparently the state supreme court concluded that the Advisory Commission's recommendation might needlessly jeopardize legislative approval of the
rules. Serious consideration should be given, however, to amending the current
rulemaking statute, TENN. Cone ANN. H 16-112 to 118 (Cum. Supp. 1978), to
conform with the recommendation made in Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative
Control over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in ConstitutionalRevision, 107

U. PA. L. Rv. 1 (1958). The authors propose that to ensure flexibility in a
procedural system rules of procedure be made by the supreme court, id. at 38,
and that to provide a representative voice on matters that might touch on policy
and substantive law court-made rules should be subject to legislative review. Id.
at 39. Such review, hbwever, should not unduly burden the flexibility of courtmade rules. The legislature should be able to amend or repeal a rule only after
the chief justice has been given an opportunity to be heard on the bill and only
if the bill passes by a two-thirds vote of both houses; the legislative action should
remain in force for a limited time only, after which the supreme court should
have the power to rescind it. Id. at 39-47.
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dealt with publication of opinions.? Deletion of this rule means
that current law remains in force .1
Of the rules deleted by the court, the deletion of rule 37 on
the publication of opinions is particularly deserving of some discussion. The principal impact of rule 37 would have been to increase significantly the number of published opinions of the intermediate appellate courts. Under current law, the opinions of the
intermediate appellate courts are generally published only if certiorari has been denied by the state supreme court." If the denial
of certiorari were an indication that the supreme court concurred
in the opinion of the intermediate appellate court, then the current law would make some sense. The supreme court, however,
has repeatedly stated that the denial of certiorari does not indicate the court's agreement with the reasons given in the opinion
of the intermediate appellate court, but only its agreement with
the result." That the denial of certiorari should indicate anything
beyond the fact that the supreme court will not review the case
is questionable." Moreover, the current practice of not publishing
83.
84.

See Theoretical Foundations, supra note 2, at 262-68.
For a discussion of the current law, see Sobieski, supra note 65, at 398-

99.
85. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-612(c) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
86. See, e.g., Adams v. State, 547 S.W.2d 553 (Tenn. 1977). Greater difficulty has been experienced defining the effect of the denial of certiorari accompanied by an opinion. See Pairamore v. Pairamore, 547 S.W.2d 545 (Tenn.
1977), noted in, Sobieski, supra note 65, at 385-87. Absent the issuance of an
opinion upon the denial of certiorari, it is impossible to know why the state
supreme court thought the intermediate appellate court reached the correct
result. Accordingly, it is difficult to attach any particular significance to the
opinion of the intermediate appellate court.
87. This will be particularly sounder the new rules. TENN. R. APP. P. 11(a)
sets forth the character of reasons that typically will be considered sufficient to
justify review by the supreme court of final decisions of the intermediate appellate courts. The fundamental purpose of rule l(a) is to identify those cases that
are of such extraordinary importance that they justify the burdens of time,
expense, and effort associated with successive appeals. See Theoretical Foundations, supra note 2, at 231-35. The important point for present purposes is that
rule 11(a) expresses the policy that the supreme court should not exercise its
discretionary review power to hear cases of interest only to the parties. In light
of that policy,
the application for permission to appeal filed in the Supreme Court
serves the purpose of demonstrating to that court that the case is an
appropriate one for the exercise of the court's discretion in favor of
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the vast majority of opinions of the intermediate appellate courts
ignores the fact that a good deal of law is made, and made authoritatively, by the intermediate appellate courts." Since unpublished opinions are not generally available,"' nonpublication is a
violation "of a fundamental presupposition of our legal order,
that the law be knowable and readily and equally accessible to
all."" Given the importance of the matter, deletion of rule 37 on
publication of opinions ought not be the final word on this difficult question.
Most of the amendments to the rules, however, seem consistent with the overall purposes of reforming the law of appellate
procedure." To be sure, some of the amendments may cause some
new problems,'2 and still further amendments may be desirable,'"
permitting an appeal. The application is not designed to serve the office
of arguing the merits of the decision of the intermediate appellate
court.
TENN. R. APP. P. 11, Advisory Comm'n comment- see Procedural Details, supra
note 2, at 18-20. In practice, the supreme court may refuse review under rule 11
only when at least four members of the court are convinced that the intermediate appellate court reached the right result for the right reason. See Traynor,
supra note 9 ; at 213-14. (Under TENN. R. APP. P. 11(e), an application for
permission to appeal will be granted only if two members of the court vote in
favor of review.) If so, the denial of review will be significant. But if the volume
of appeals or other reasons preclude the supreme court from righting every
wrong of the intermediate appellate courts, the denial of review should have
little independent significance.
88. This may be true for the simple reason that, because of the disproportionate expense of seeking review or other reasons, recourse to the state supreme
court either has not been attempted or has been precluded, thus rendering the
decision of the intermediate appellate court the authoritative last word. Indeed,
it has even been suggested that some disappointed litigants will refrain from
seeking supreme court review for the very purpose of avoiding publication of the
opinion of an intermediate appellate court if their petition for certiorari is unavailing.
89. Alternatively, if unpublished opinions are made generally available by
unofficial reporting services, "that in turn frustrates the objective of a nonpublication policy, namely, reducing the quantity of printed material that lawyers must read and use." P. CARUuNGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE
ON APPEAL

36 (1976).

90. Id.
91. See Theoretical Foundations, supra note 2, at 168-70.
92. One of the most obvious difficulties likely to arise involves the state
supreme court's decision to retain the requirement that the trial court approve
the transcript or statement of the evidence and authenticate the exhibits. Be-
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particularly in light of experience as the rules are tested in practice.9 ' For a time at least, however, the new rules should prove to
be a desirable simplification and modernization of the Tennessee
law of appellate procedure.
cause the Advisory Commission's proposal did not generally require approval of
the record by the trial court, rule 25(a) measures the 30-day period the clerk of
the trial court is allotted to assemble, number, and complete the record from
the date the transcript or statement of the evidence is filed. Rule 25(a) was not
amended when the state supreme court reinstated the requirement of trial
court approval of the record, and under rule 24(e) the trial court may take up
to 45 days after its filing to approve the transcript or statement. Thus; rule 25(a)
directs the clerk to complete and transmit the record to the appellate court
before the trial court must act to approve it. Of course, the trial court may
approve the record shortly after it is filed so that the clerk may complete and
transmit the record on time, and the clerk may seek an extension of time for
completion of the record. See TENN. R. App. P. 25(d). Still, some problems are
likely to arise and should be remedied by an amendment to the new rules.
93. For example, rule 25(a) does not explicitly establish the procedure that
the clerk of the trial court should follow if no transcript or statement of the
evidence or proceedings is to be filed. The grant of a motion for summary
judgment is but one example of such a case. The best approach in these cases
would seem to be to require the appellant to notify the clerk of the trial court
within some reasonable time, perhaps 15 days after notice of appeal is filed, that
no transcript or statement is to be filed. The clerk could then be required to
discharge his obligations concerning completion and transmission of the record
within 30 days after receipt of appellant's notice.
Similarly, rule 42(a) on the issuance of the mandates of the appellate courts
should probably be amended to address the issuance of mandates from the state
supreme court to the intermediate appellate courts, an area not treated in the
current version of the rule. Rule 42(a) also needs to be amended to include a
phrase providing that if a petition for rehearing is filed with an intermediate
appellate court, the mandate of that court will issue 31 days after entry of the
order denying the petition or entry of the judgment on rehearing. See Procedural
Details, supra note 2, at 101. The further amendments mentioned in this note
are by no means the only ones that should be considered.
94. See Theoretical Foundations, supra note 2, at 179-80.

